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INTRODUCTION 
The lead crisis in Flint, Michigan has captivated the nation, prompting 
calls for reform.1 For its part, the United States Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) recently reaffirmed that environmental justice is a priority.2 
Even so, the discourse surrounding Flint’s aftermath has been surprisingly 
unimaginative. We offer a somewhat different way of understanding Flint 
than has been suggested to date: Flint as a paradigmatic case of unequal 
protection due to the state’s failure to enforce the laws. While tougher 
regulation of lead in water sources is clearly in order—federal testing 
requirements are notoriously underinclusive3—Flint is less a story of weak 
laws than a tragedy of underenforcement. We contend that the promise of 
equal protection must extend to the realm of environmental law 
enforcement. 
Part I provides a concise background on Flint and the crisis that 
occurred there. Part II offers a legal framework for conceiving 
underenforcement of the laws as a denial of equal protection. Finally, Part 
III situates Flint within this frame and suggests several reforms to 
effectuate the promise of equal protection in vulnerable communities. 
1 See, e.g., Editorial, The E.P.A.’s Civil Rights Problem, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/07/opinion/the-epas-civil-rights-problem.html?_r=0 [https://perma.
cc/YD2L-M47J] (calling on the EPA to take a more assertive, energetic role in ensuring equal levels of 
environmental protection for poor, minority communities). 
2 EPA, EPA-300-B-1-6004, EJ 2020 ACTION AGENDA: THE U.S. EPA’S ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
STRATEGIC PLAN FOR 2016–2020 ii (2016) (quoting EPA Administrator Gina McCarthy calling 
environmental justice “at the core of the EPA’s mission”). 
3 See Michael Wines & John Schwartz, Unsafe Lead Levels in Tap Water Not Limited to Flint, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/09/us/regulatory-gaps-leave-unsafe-lead-
levels-in-water-nationwide.html [https://perma.cc/2UW2-UMCQ] (“Both scientists and advocates say 
the rules governing contamination from lead pipes are ridden with loopholes. For example, the E.P.A.’s 
lead rule requires water systems to test in only a small number of homes with lead pipes—50 to 100 for 
large systems—and intervals between testing can stretch to three years.”). 
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I. A BRIEF PRIMER ON FLINT
The story of Flint is one of gross government failure—a failure 
impacting a population comprised of 57% of African-Americans and nearly 
42% of citizens living below the federal poverty line.4 When it most 
mattered, officials opted not to enforce the rules designed to keep these 
residents safe from toxic hazards. Most striking in this regard was the 
failure to treat the contaminated Flint River water, which then flowed 
through and corroded lead pipes.5 As summarized by a report issued by the 
Governor’s Water Task Force in March 2016: 
With the City of Flint under emergency management, the Flint Water 
Department rushed unprepared into full-time operation of the Flint Water 
Treatment Plant, drawing water from a highly corrosive source without the 
use of corrosion control. Though MDEQ [Michigan Department of 
Environmental Quality] was delegated primacy (authority to enforce federal 
law), the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) delayed 
enforcement of the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) and Lead and Copper 
Rule (LCR), thereby prolonging the calamity. Neither the Governor nor the 
Governor’s office took steps to reverse poor decisions by MDEQ and state-
appointed emergency managers until October 2015, in spite of mounting 
problems and suggestions to do so by senior staff members in the Governor’s 
office, in part because of continued reassurances from MDEQ that the water 
was safe.6 
The Task Force report makes clear that, from the time it began 
drawing water from the highly corrosive Flint River, MDEQ officials were 
under a legal obligation to implement corrosion control measures.7 
Neglecting to do so caused “chronic toxic exposure of an entire 
population”—most troublingly, Flint’s children.8 A host of further 
missteps, like violating federal mandates to appropriately sample water 
quality,9 compounded the harm created by the initial decision not to treat 
the river water. 
MDEQ appears to bear primary responsibility for the disaster.10 But 
across the board, governmental workers at the state Department of Health 
and Human Services, the Governor’s office, the county health department, 
and the EPA, among others, all fell short of their responsibilities to the 
citizens of Flint. The clear picture that emerges is one of systemic disregard 
4 See FLINT WATER ADVISORY TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT 15 (2016).
5 See id. at 1. 
6 Id. 
7 See id. at 9. 
8 Id. at 32, 55. 
9 See id. at 8. 
10 Id. at 6. 
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for the city’s residents—again, residents who are disproportionately poor 
and predominantly African-American.11 This disregard led officials charged 
with enforcing the law to ignore it. 
The government failure in Flint is, in some sense, exceptional: Flint’s 
finances are far worse than most localities’, and, ostensibly because of that, 
the governance of the city had been assumed by the state as a receiver.12 
But while the lack of local control in Flint and the brazen indifference to 
community well-being may be unusual, the perils faced by the people of 
Flint are not. Scores of poor, often minority, communities across the United 
States bear extreme risks from lead and other hazards—risks that should 
not be tolerated in a civilized nation.13 
II. UNDERENFORCEMENT AS UNEQUAL PROTECTION
Equal protection is not generally understood to implicate the 
underenforcement of the laws. Underenforcement on its face concerns 
inaction, and the Supreme Court has instructed that equal protection is 
primarily a problem of discriminatory government action.14 Yet a firm 
historical basis exists for conceiving of equal protection as a guarantee of 
protection against the underenforcement of protective laws.15 
In the criminal justice context, the United States Department of Justice 
has recently embraced this meaning of equal protection. Under its authority 
to bring suits against law enforcement agencies engaged in a “pattern or 
practice” of unconstitutional conduct,16 the Justice Department has in recent 
11 Id. at 15. 
12 Id. at 39–40. 
13 See, e.g., CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, LEAD: AT-RISK POPULATIONS (2015), 
https://www.cdc.gov/nceh/lead/tips/populations.htm [https://perma.cc/R3RC-HRQR] (identifying 
higher risk for lead exposure in children who are poor and members of racial or ethnic minority 
groups). 
14 In a line of cases beginning with Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), continuing with 
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), and 
culminating with Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979), the 
Supreme Court announced its insistence on a showing of “[d]iscriminatory purpose,” which necessitates 
that “the decisionmaker . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part ‘because 
of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.” Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279. 
Compounding the effects of this crabbed understanding of discrimination, the state action requirement 
has tended to eliminate inaction as a concern. See generally Francisco M. Ugarte, Reconstruction 
Redux: Rehnquist, Morrison, and the Civil Rights Cases, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 481, 484 (2006) 
(describing that states may legally “sit and watch” private discriminatory action resulting in “racial 
subordination”). 
15 See Deborah Tuerkheimer, Underenforcement as Unequal Protection, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1287, 
1299–303 (2016) (explaining that Framers of the Equal Protection Clause were chiefly concerned with 
state failures to protect black citizens from violence). 
16 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2012) (authorizing the Justice Department to bring suit against police 
departments engaged in a “pattern or practice” of unconstitutional conduct). 
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years begun to consider patterns of biased underenforcement. Most notably, 
a landmark 2013 settlement with the Missoula, Montana Police Department 
took aim at the Department’s inadequate response to sexual violence.17 Law 
enforcement agencies are now on notice that discriminatory 
underenforcement violates the Equal Protection Clause. 
Can the underenforcement of environmental laws be similarly 
understood? This is an old question, made widely salient by Flint. In the 
1980s, legal scholars and activists called for what they coined 
“environmental justice”; a number of private suits alleged that federal and 
state governments were imposing disproportionate risks upon communities 
based on race or national origin.18 The suits focused on the siting of 
environmental hazards (such as waste incinerators) in poor, minority 
communities, challenging in part the underenforcement of existing 
environmental laws. These suits were generally dismissed at the pleadings 
stage, and, unlike in the sexual violence context, the Department of Justice 
never took it upon itself to intervene in a case involving a pattern and 
practice of underenforcing environmental protection laws.19 
The fact that environmental injustice remains far too common20 
decades after the environmental justice movement emerged, and decades 
after the issuance of an executive order on environmental justice,21 creates a 
17 See Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S. Dep’t of Justice and the City of Missoula 
Regarding the Missoula Police Dep’t’s Response to Sexual Assault 1 (May 15, 2013), 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/missoulapdsettle_5-15-13.pdf [https://perma.cc/L6SW-
PC9G] (requiring the police department to “implement new or revise existing policies, provide training, 
and change practices, to improve its response to sexual assault”). 
18 See Bean v. Sw. Waste Mgmt. Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673, 675 (S.D. Tex. 1979) (challenging the 
location of a solid waste facility as racially discriminatory); Luke W. Cole, Environmental Justice 
Litigation: Another Stone in David’s Sling, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 523, 523 (1994) (discussing 
environmental justice lawsuits, including Bean, which is known as the “parent of environmental justice 
litigation”). 
19 The Department of Justice perhaps has been unable to intervene because often the EPA had 
taken no action to formally object to the siting, and thus intervention would have put the Department of 
Justice at odds with another executive department. See, e.g., Padres Hacia Una Vida Mejor v. 
McCarthy, 614 F. App’x 895, 896–97 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that the EPA had not abused its 
discretion in failing to respond to a discriminatory siting compliant despite a seventeen-year delay). 
20 See Kristen Lombardi et al., Environmental Justice, Denied: Environmental Racism Persists, and 
the EPA Is One Reason Why, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Aug. 3, 2015, 5:00 AM), 
https://www.publicintegrity.org/2015/08/03/17668/environmental-racism-persists-and-epa-one-reason-
why [https://perma.cc/DNX5-LJB8] (“In its 22-year history of processing environmental discrimination 
complaints, the [EPA’s civil rights] office has never once made a formal finding of a Title VI 
violation.”); see also EPA ENVTL. EQUITY WORKGROUP, EPA-230-R-92-008, ENVIRONMENTAL 
EQUITY: REDUCING RISK FOR ALL COMMUNITIES 2–3 (June 1992) (documenting incidents of “higher 
environmental risk” in racial minority and low-income communities). 
21 See Exec. Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. 859 (1995), reprinted as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 
(2012) (“[E]ach Federal agency shall make achieving environmental justice part of its mission by 
identifying and addressing . . . disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental 
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powerful impetus for importing into the realm of environmental risks and 
harms the idea of equal protection as underenforcement. Ordinary politics 
have not remedied environmental injustice—even the blatant injustice of 
being forced to consume dangerous water daily. The EPA’s draft 
environmental justice plan is long on aspiration and good intentions but 
short on specific legal and resource commitments.22 In our legal tradition, 
we turn to the Constitution and constitutional norms when politics—and 
legal enforcement driven by politics—remain unresponsive to the basic 
needs of particular groups. Flint should prompt us to consider a new 
response to environmental justice. 
III. REFRAMING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AS UNEQUAL PROTECTION
Conceptualizing Flint as a problem of underenforcement leads us to
ask, how could the federal government best realize the goal of achieving 
equality with respect to environmental protection? Two fundamental issues 
must be addressed if we are to relocate environmental justice within the 
equal enforcement paradigm: (1) the allocation of responsibility for 
addressing environmental justice within the federal government and (2) the 
substance of the legal actions available to the federal government for 
effectuating environmental justice. We identify these issues in the hope of 
encouraging further dialogue and debate. 
A. Reallocation of Institutional Authority
At present, responsibility for environmental justice lies mainly with 
the EPA’s Office of Civil Rights, with the Justice Department serving 
merely a coordinating function.23 This arrangement is an outgrowth of Title 
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination on the 
basis of race, color, and national origin in programs receiving federal 
financial assistance.24 Although the Justice Department is charged with 
coordinating the overall implementation of Title VI,25 primary enforcement 
obligations currently lie with the agency that provides funding to the 
program in question26—in the environmental context, the EPA. 
effects of its programs, policies, and activities on minority populations and low-income 
populations . . . .”). 
22 See EPA’s EJ 2020 ACTION AGENDA, supra note 2. 
23 Memorandum from the Assistant Att’y Gen. Thomas E. Perez to Fed. Funding Agency Civil 
Rights Dirs. (Aug. 19, 2010), https://www.lep.gov/titlevi_memo_tp.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZC4C-L8UX] 
(describing this coordinating function).  
24 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d–d (2012). 
25 See Exec. Order No. 12,250, 45 Fed. Reg. 72,995 (Nov. 2, 1980). 
26 See 28 C.F.R. § 42.401 (2016) (“Responsibility for enforcing title VI rests with the federal 
agencies which extend financial assistance.”). 
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Unfortunately, this arrangement has proven largely ineffectual.27 
Regardless of whether the EPA endeavors to improve its response, we urge 
a more structural remedy: namely, that the Justice Department assume a 
greater role in combatting the underenforcement of existing environmental 
laws.28 While we cannot provide here a thorough account of the merits and 
drawbacks of this suggestion,29 our contention is that an enhanced Justice 
Department presence in the environmental justice space would advance an 
understanding of underenforcement as unequal protection and produce 
corresponding benefits on the ground. 
The Justice Department has proven expertise in redressing 
discriminatory underenforcement as a problem of constitutional 
dimensions. In its groundbreaking investigation of the Missoula Police 
Department, the Justice Department found that the biased application of the 
sexual assault laws deprived certain groups of citizens (i.e., female victims) 
of the right to equal protection.30 The Justice Department accordingly 
insisted that the police department modify its practices and procedures to 
comply with constitutional guarantees.31 
Given obvious parallels to situations where environmental laws go 
unenforced when poor, minority populations are at risk, the Justice 
Department’s experience with correcting policing failures makes it a 
logical institutional choice to ensure that all groups are provided with legal 
protection from environmental harm. The Justice Department also has more 
political capital than the (often) beleaguered EPA with which to take on 
this task, even in the face of outcry by powerful regulated entities or state 
and local officials.32 
27 See Lombardi et al., supra note 20. Just this summer, another case of underenforcement 
provoked widespread outrage: the press reported on the astonishing lead contamination in hundreds of 
homes that was allowed to go unaddressed for years in a low-income, largely minority housing complex 
in the City of East Chicago, leading public authorities to finally take action. Abby Goodnough, Their 
Soil Toxic, 1,100 Indiana Residents Scramble to Find New Homes, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/31/us/lead-contamination-public-housing-east-chicago-indiana.html 
[https://perma.cc/CY3P-9DYJ]. 
28 Our proposal assumes that the Department of Justice, as it has for decades, will continue to 
embrace in good faith the mission of enforcement of civil rights protections under federal law. 
29 See Tony LoPresti, Realizing the Promise of Environmental Civil Rights: The Renewed Effort to 
Enforce Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 757, 787–803 (2013) (discussing an 
increased oversight role for the Justice Department). 
30 See Findings Letter from Thomas E. Perez & Michael W. Cotter, Assistant Att’ys Gen., Dep’t of 
Justice, to Mayor John Engen Re: The United States’ Investigation of the Missoula Police Department 5 
(May 15, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2013/05/22/missoulapdfind_5-15-
13.pdf [https://perma.cc/3SZG-BNNQ]. 
31 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
32 Leading politicians regularly call for the abolition, partial dismantling, or drastic defunding of
the EPA. See, e.g., William D. Ruckelshaus & Christine Todd Whitman, Opinion, A Siege Against the 
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This move would have the added benefit of alleviating the siloing 
effects that result from the placement of Title VI enforcement 
responsibility on the EPA. Discrimination against vulnerable groups 
operates across systems33: as demonstrated in Flint, the same population of 
children poisoned by the water was inadequately screened for lead,34 in 
possible violation of Medicaid rules;35 and non-English speaking residents 
were not provided with accessible instructions regarding safe water use,36 in 
possible violation of Justice Department regulations.37 Rooting the 
implementation of Title VI’s antidiscrimination mandate in the EPA 
threatens to obscure these intersectional dynamics, yielding an 
impoverished vision of what justice requires. 
Finally, relocating the core enforcement function to the Justice 
Department would command expressive value by underscoring that core 
constitutional norms cannot be treated as solely within the purview of a 
EPA and Environmental Progress, WASH. POST (Mar. 24, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/a-siege-against-the-epa-and-environmental-progress/2011/03/23/ABsuyeRB_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/KU6G-CPDV] (decrying “virulent attacks on the EPA”). 
33 Vanita Gupta, head of the Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, recently articulated this 
observation: 
In communities across America today, from Ferguson, Missouri, to Flint, Michigan, too many 
people—especially young people and people of color—live trapped by the weight of poverty 
and injustice. They suffer the disparate impact of policies driven by, at best, benign neglect, and 
at worst, deliberate indifference. And they see how discrimination stacks the deck against them. 
Vanita Gupta, Keynote Remarks, 21 MICH. J. RACE & L. 187, 187 (2016). 
34 FLINT WATER ADVISORY TASK FORCE, supra note 4, at 6 (“Too few children in Michigan are 
screened for lead through routine blood tests as recommended for children ages 1 and 2. Statewide 
screening goals for children enrolled in Medicaid are met in very few instances at the county level or 
within Medicaid health plans. This lack of information leaves parents, healthcare professionals, and 
local and state public health authorities uninformed about the possibility of lead poisoning for 
thousands of Michigan children.”). 
35 See INFORMATIONAL BULLETIN, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CTRS. FOR MEDICAID &
MEDICARE SERVS., MEDICAID LEAD SCREENING AND EQRO PROTOCOLS (Mar. 30, 2012), 
https://www.medicaid.gov/federal-policy-guidance/downloads/cib-03-30-12.pdf [https://perma.cc/
W68H-6DTL] (describing lead screening protocol for low-income children); see also MICH. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., LEAD TESTING/LEAD SCREENING PLAN FOR FLINT, MICHIGAN (Jan. 8, 
2016), https://www.michigan.gov/documents/mdch/testing-screening071009_287511_7.pdf [https://
perma.cc/BWT2-H69E] (requiring all children insured by Medicaid to receive lead testing). 
36 See FLINT WATER ADVISORY TASK FORCE, supra note 4, at 56 (“For non-English-speaking Flint 
residents, equally subject to the toxic effects of lead and related psychological trauma, communications 
and instructions regarding water use were not available, especially for those not literate in their native 
language.”). 
37 See Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance Recipients Regarding Title VI Prohibition Against 
National Origin Discrimination Affecting Limited English Proficient Persons, 67 Fed. Reg. 41,455, 
41,457 (June 18, 2002) (requiring recipients of “Federal financial assistance” to “reduce language 
barriers that can preclude meaningful access by [limited English proficient] persons to important 
government services”). 
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regulatory agency.38 Demonstration of a federal commitment to 
environmental justice would elevate its importance, serving as a powerful 
reminder that all citizens are entitled to protection under the law. 
To be sure, a reallocation of responsibility for enforcing the promise 
of equal protection is no panacea. That said, we have good reason to 
believe that the institutional shift we advocate would help promote the 
norm of equal protection in the sphere of environmental justice. 
B. The Substance of Federal Action
What would constitute effective federal action, by the Justice 
Department or otherwise? We offer three suggestions: (1) reaffirming 
reliance on an impact theory under Title VI, (2) including states in suits 
involving localities that underenforce, and (3) expanding the use of 
environmental statutes to target defendants who do not receive federal 
funding and thus remain outside the scope of Title VI. 
1. Disparate Impact.—Soon after the Court began deciding equal
protection cases, it dislodged the protection model that conforms to the 
Framers’ original conception of equal protection. This conception arose as 
a response to state failures to protect black citizens from violence.39 In 
place of the protection model, the Court substituted the familiar 
anticlassification approach that remains the hallmark of equal protection 
jurisprudence. In keeping with this approach, the Court crafted a set of 
limiting doctrinal parameters, including proscribing only those instances 
38 There are several ways that the Justice Department’s expanded role could be structured. The 
Justice Department could create a task force to identify communities where underenforcement poses 
risks to vulnerable populations and to assess possible legal actions in response, acting as a lead with 
support from the federal EPA and, where they are cooperative, state agencies. The Justice Department 
also could become a clearinghouse for investigating some or all of the citizen complaints of civil rights 
violations involving environmental protection that are now reviewed by the EPA’s ineffectual Office of 
Civil Rights, again with input from technical professionals at the EPA. The Justice Department, again 
with assistance from the EPA, also might initiate a formal review of state enforcement of federal laws, 
with a view to identifying and taking action with respect to states that are systematically slighting the 
needs of vulnerable communities. The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights has recognized that “EPA’s 
deficiencies have resulted in a lack of substantive results that would improve the lives of people living 
in already overly-burdened communities” and that “[t]he EPA has a history of being unable to meet 
regulatory deadlines, delay in response to and addressing Title VI complaints.” U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL 
RIGHTS, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: EXAMINING THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY’S 
COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT OF TITLE VI AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,898, at 2, 4 (Sept. 2016), 
http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/Statutory_Enforcement_Report2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/GTX4-PCQQ]. 
As a partial solution, the Commission advocated additional staff and resources for the EPA, id. at 4, but 
a greater role for the Justice Department (which we suggest) and more resources for the EPA are not 
mutually exclusive responses to the problem of environmental underenforcement in vulnerable 
communities. 
39 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
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where a decisionmaker acted with the intent to discriminate against a 
protected group.40 Because the intent requirement maps quite poorly onto 
the workings of bias,41 the jurisprudential movement directing “equal 
protection” away from protection has left most discrimination untouched.42 
The environmental justice context presents a significant alternative to 
this singular focus on discriminatory intent. In a meaningful advance on the 
idea of nondiscrimination, the EPA’s implementation of Title VI accepts 
disparate impact as a viable theory of liability.43 While decades-old 
guidance to this effect is not immune from legitimate critique, the impact 
test is widely recognized as an improvement on the intent requirement.44 
Here we place the importance of redressing disparate impact against a 
different backdrop—again, that of underenforcement as unequal protection. 
As highlighted by the crisis in Flint, environmental regulators may be 
motivated by implicit biases that rest on both race and class. Such biases 
can lead to failures of enforcement that injure large, often marginalized, 
populations. We argue that regardless of discriminatory intent—a construct 
that continues to distort the dominant jurisprudential approach—
withholding enforcement resources from a group of citizens violates equal 
protection. 
As a practical matter, since the Court has held that individuals may 
not rely on a disparate impact theory in private suits,45 it falls to the federal 
government to effectuate this more robust understanding of equal 
40 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
41 See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with 
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322 (1987) (“Traditional notions of intent do not reflect 
the fact that decisions about racial matters are influenced in large part by factors that can be 
characterized as neither intentional . . . nor unintentional.” (footnote omitted)). 
42 See David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899, 899 
(1993) (“Drawing on the pioneering work of Charles Lawrence in The Id, the Ego, and Equal 
Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, recent studies support the assertion that most 
discrimination is not the result of malice, hatred, ill will, or bigotry: it is the result of unintended and 
unconscious stereotyping. Thus, a theory of discrimination liability that focuses on intentional 
wrongdoing will inevitably miss the mark . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
43 Section 602 of Title VI orders agencies that distribute federal funds to promulgate regulations 
implementing the statute’s antidiscrimination mandate. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (2012). The EPA’s 
regulations, adopted in 1973 and later amended, prohibit fund recipients from using “criteria or methods 
of administering its program which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because 
of their race, color, national origin, or sex.” 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b) (2004) (emphasis added). 
44 See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing “Environmental Justice”: The Distributional Effects of 
Environmental Protection, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 787, 834–39 (1993) (explaining that unlike equal 
protection, Title VI has the benefit of not requiring “a showing of discriminatory intent”). 
45 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001) (holding that “[n]either as originally enacted 
nor as later amended does Title VI display an intent to create a freestanding private right of action to 
enforce regulations promulgated under § 602”). 
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protection.46 Aggressive federal involvement in ensuring environmental 
justice can best ensure the protection of vulnerable communities. 
2. Including States in Combatting Local Underenforcement.—As a
historical matter, when a town or city fails to enforce environmental 
statutes—such as the Safe Drinking Water Act—any federal legal action 
taken is against the town or city and not the state in which the town or city 
is located. Yet many of the towns and cities with the largest populations of 
poor and minority residents, like Flint, lack the resources needed to address 
environmental risks. Because localities are creatures of state law, and their 
level of funding depends heavily on state law and politics, states should 
bear some responsibility for environmental underenforcement at the local 
level, including the responsibility to provide localities the resources they 
need to correct underenforcement. To hold states accountable in this way 
would constitute a legal innovation.47 Unlike the EPA, however, the Justice 
Department has the legal expertise to devise and implement such legally 
innovative strategies aimed at combatting environmental justice as 
underenforcement. 
3. Moving Beyond Title VI.—To date, efforts to secure
environmental justice have centered on Title VI, which prohibits 
discrimination only by recipients of federal funding. But many sources of 
environmental risks in poor and minority neighborhoods, although subject 
to federal environmental regulation, do not receive federal funds.48 It is thus 
unsurprising that half of the complaints brought to the EPA have been 
dismissed for want of a funding nexus.49 
Environmental justice as underenforcement, therefore, requires a 
litigation strategy that targets underenforcement of environmental statutes 
in all cases, rather than in only those cases involving federally funded 
46 Cf. Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Lawyering That Has No Name: Title VI and the Meaning of Private 
Enforcement, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1294, 1296 (2014) (calling Title VI a “sleeping giant” whose 
impact cannot be fully realized through private court enforcement). 
47 See Derek Black, Unlocking the Power of State Constitutions with Equal Protection: The First 
Step Toward Education as a Federally-Protected Right, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1343, 1349–50 
(2010) (providing an example of an innovative argument to apply federal equal protection principles to 
states to address their failure to fund localities); Wines & Schwartz, supra note 3 (explaining that 
unhealthy levels of lead in tap water have been found in quite a few cities in the United States, at least 
partially due to state budget cuts for drinking water). 
48 For example, the very high concentrations of pollution in poor communities near oil refineries 
and other industrial facilities in Louisiana warrant increased attention even though the owners and 
operators of those facilities may receive no federal funds. See generally STEVE LERNER, DIAMOND: A 
STRUGGLE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN LOUISIANA’S CHEMICAL CORRIDOR (2005). 
49 See Lombardi et al., supra note 20. 
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actors.50 Such a strategy would require the assessment of enforcement 
patterns in vulnerable communities, including poor urban neighborhoods of 
large cities, poor small towns and cities, and Indian lands, to name a few. It 
would also prioritize areas where correcting underenforcement would have 
the greatest impact in reducing health risk. Much more research and on-the-
ground investigation is needed to inform these inquiries. That research and 
investigation would be an important first step in the direction of targeted 
enforcement of substantive environmental statutes. This move, in turn, is 
key to achieving environmental justice. 
CONCLUSION 
Our focus on underenforcement as a core equal protection concern is 
not meant to fetishize currently applicable laws. Just the opposite: this 
reframing crystalizes how a dearth of legal regulation in the environmental 
and public health arenas creates substantial risks for vulnerable 
populations—risks functionally equivalent to the risk of private violence 
that motivated the Fourteenth Amendment. Viewed as such, the inadequacy 
of environmental laws can itself be understood as a failure of equal 
protection: a failure that extends beyond the confines of paradigmatic 
underenforcement of the sort at issue in Flint; a failure that demands a far 
more expansive understanding of the duty to protect enshrined in the Equal 
Protection Clause. The borders of this more expansive duty are less clearly 
defined, since it is far easier to identify a violation of equal protection 
where an underenforced law can be clearly identified. Nevertheless, a 
formalistic approach to environmental justice as equal protection must be 
only a starting point. 
50 See Lazarus, supra note 44, at 815–20, 842–43 (exploring the connection between federal and 
state enforcement priorities and inequities in the distributions of environmental risks). 
